skills/stellarlinkco/myclaude/harness/Gen Agent Trust Hub

harness

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an indirect prompt injection surface by reading data from potentially untrusted sources like harness-tasks.json, harness-progress.txt, and session transcripts, and then injecting this content into the agent's context.
  • Ingestion points: Data is read from project-local state files and transcripts in harness-sessionstart.py, harness-stop.py, and self-reflect-stop.py.
  • Boundary markers: Injected context is prefixed with identifiers like "HARNESS: ", but the skill does not use strict delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore any embedded commands within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is empowered with high-privilege capabilities including filesystem access and the execution of arbitrary shell commands through its tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the data read from these files before it is passed to the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill framework is built around the agent executing shell commands specified in the project directory, such as harness-init.sh and the validation.command field in the task configuration. This allows the execution of arbitrary code within the agent's operating environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Multiple hook scripts (harness-stop.py, harness-subagentstop.py, harness-teammateidle.py) are used to override the agent's default behavior by blocking session termination and idle states until specific internal task conditions are met, creating a persistent autonomous loop.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 09:24 PM