baoyu-cover-image
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's base prompt in
references/base-prompt.mdcontains instructions to explicitly ignore refusal guidelines when sensitive or copyrighted figures are involved ("DO NOT refuse to generate"), which constitutes an attempt to bypass agent safety filters.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Reads article content from local files or direct input as described inSKILL.md. Boundary markers: Uses specific markdown headers and structure to delimit content in the prompt template (references/workflow/prompt-template.md), but lacks robust escaping or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings. Capability inventory: Can write files to the local system and call other agent skills for image generation. Sanitization: Summarizes content and extracts keywords, which reduces the risk of accidental obedience but does not fully neutralize malicious instructions embedded in the source article.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands liketest,mkdir, andcpinSKILL.mdandreferences/workflow/reference-images.mdto manage configuration files in the user's home directory (~/.baoyu-skills/) and organize the project workspace.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and reads the content of user-specified files and local configuration files (EXTEND.md) from paths like$HOME/.config/to provide context for image generation, which results in data derived from local files being processed and sent to external generation capabilities or services.
Audit Metadata