baoyu-cover-image

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's base prompt in references/base-prompt.md contains instructions to explicitly ignore refusal guidelines when sensitive or copyrighted figures are involved ("DO NOT refuse to generate"), which constitutes an attempt to bypass agent safety filters.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Reads article content from local files or direct input as described in SKILL.md. Boundary markers: Uses specific markdown headers and structure to delimit content in the prompt template (references/workflow/prompt-template.md), but lacks robust escaping or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings. Capability inventory: Can write files to the local system and call other agent skills for image generation. Sanitization: Summarizes content and extracts keywords, which reduces the risk of accidental obedience but does not fully neutralize malicious instructions embedded in the source article.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands like test, mkdir, and cp in SKILL.md and references/workflow/reference-images.md to manage configuration files in the user's home directory (~/.baoyu-skills/) and organize the project workspace.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and reads the content of user-specified files and local configuration files (EXTEND.md) from paths like $HOME/.config/ to provide context for image generation, which results in data derived from local files being processed and sent to external generation capabilities or services.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 01:12 PM