orchestrating-codex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong, high-priority directives (marked with 🔴) that instruct the agent to bypass its own context analysis phase and immediately delegate tasks based on raw user input.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an Indirect Prompt Injection surface by design, as it interpolates untrusted user content directly into prompts for downstream agents.
- Ingestion points: The
Phase 1: 計画策定section inWORKFLOW-GUIDE.mdandINSTRUCTIONS.mdspecifies passing the{ユーザー要求}(user requirement) directly to the planner agent. - Boundary markers: The prompt template uses simple bold markers (e.g.,
**ユーザー要求:**) but lacks robust delimiters or explicit instructions to the sub-agent to ignore instructions embedded within the provided data. - Capability inventory: The sub-agents invoked (e.g.,
tachikoma-architecture,tachikoma-database,tachikoma-bash) have extensive capabilities including file system modification, database schema execution, and version control operations via Jujutsu (jj). - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly discourage sanitization by stating "Codex本体はファイルを読まない・分析しない" (Codex itself does not read or analyze files), relying entirely on the sub-agent to handle potentially malicious input safely.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrated workflow involves the parallel execution of multiple sub-agents with significant operational permissions. While intended for development, this capability could be exploited if a malicious implementation plan is successfully injected via the indirect prompt vector.
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