remotion-best-practices
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides patterns for executing external processes and scripts.
rules/transcribe-captions.md: Recommends usingchild_process.execSyncto invokeffmpegfor audio conversion.rules/voiceover.md: Instructs the agent/user to execute a custom Node.js script usingnode --env-file=.envto generate voiceovers.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill frequently instructs the agent to install external dependencies and assets.
- Multiple files (
rules/3d.md,rules/audio.md,rules/fonts.md, etc.) provide commands to install various@remotion/*packages,zod@3.22.3,mapbox-gl, and@turf/turffrom the NPM registry. rules/lottie.md: Fetches Lottie animation JSON files fromassets4.lottiefiles.com.rules/tailwind.md: Directs the agent to fetch documentation fromwww.remotion.dev.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data.
- Ingestion points:
calculateMetadatafunctions inrules/calculate-metadata.mdandrules/compositions.mdfetch JSON data from external URLs provided via componentprops. - Boundary markers: None identified. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
fetchAPI to retrieve remote data andcalculateMetadatato influence the rendering pipeline. - Sanitization: None identified. Fetched data is spread directly into the component's
propsobject without validation or filtering.
Audit Metadata