codex-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides the
codex exectool for arbitrary shell execution. Dangerous flags like--yoloand--full-autoare documented to explicitly disable sandboxing and user approvals, giving the agent full system control. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Sensitive OAuth tokens from
~/.codex/auth.jsonare accessed and synchronized into agent profiles. The documentation also suggests piping secrets viaprintenv, which can expose them in shell history. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill demonstrates adding external Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers from non-whitelisted third-party domains such as
deepwiki.com. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The tool provides a direct bridge between LLM prompts and local shell execution, allowing the agent to generate and run arbitrary code on the host machine.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Full filesystem access, when combined with optional network connectivity through flags like
--search, facilitates the exfiltration of sensitive user data. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect injection. Ingestion points include local source files and PR diffs. There are no boundary markers or sanitization logic, while the agent possesses dangerous capabilities like
execandwrite(SKILL.md).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata