imap-smtp-email

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it fetches and processes untrusted content from external email servers.
  • Ingestion points: The scripts/imap.js file fetches email subjects, plain text bodies, and HTML content using the mailparser library, which is then returned to the agent context.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within email content are provided in SKILL.md.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes powerful capabilities such as sending emails (scripts/smtp.js) and modifying email states (scripts/imap.js). These could be triggered by instructions found within a processed email.
  • Sanitization: While mailparser correctly parses email structures, there is no sanitization or filtering logic to detect or neutralize natural language instructions embedded within the email text.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The scripts/smtp.js tool allows for attaching arbitrary local files to outgoing emails via the --attach parameter. An attacker could potentially exfiltrate sensitive files, such as the .env configuration file or SSH keys, by manipulating the agent into sending an email with these files attached.
  • [SAFE]: The skill implements a setup.sh script to assist users in configuring their credentials locally. This is a standard and recommended practice for managing sensitive environment variables without hardcoding them into the skill logic.
  • [SAFE]: The use of IMAP_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED and SMTP_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED flags allows users to connect to servers with self-signed certificates. While disabling certificate validation (setting to false) introduces a risk of Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, the default behavior and the documentation encourage secure configurations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 21, 2026, 01:04 AM