pinch-to-post

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a provided shell script, wp-rest.sh, to execute WordPress and WooCommerce management tasks.
  • Evidence: The script performs various operations using curl, jq, and standard Unix utilities to interact with remote APIs.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The check-links command in the wp-rest.sh script performs outbound HTTP requests to external URLs discovered within site content.
  • Evidence: The script extracts URLs from post content and uses curl to verify their status codes.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires the configuration of sensitive environment variables, including WP_APP_PASSWORD, WC_CONSUMER_KEY, and WC_CONSUMER_SECRET.
  • Evidence: Documentation in README.md and SKILL.md instructs users to provide these credentials for API authentication.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves untrusted data from the managed WordPress site that the agent then processes.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through commands like list-comments, pending-comments, and get-post in wp-rest.sh.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore commands found within retrieved site content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has powerful capabilities, including delete-post, bulk-delete-old, wc-delete-product, and update-post via wp-rest.sh.
  • Sanitization: Content is processed via jq and sed, but raw comment and post text is passed back to the agent for evaluation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 21, 2026, 01:00 PM