pollinations
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/chat.shperforms unquoted expansion of the$HEADERSvariable within acurlcommand. This creates a shell injection vulnerability if thePOLLINATIONS_API_KEYenvironment variable is manipulated to contain shell metacharacters such as semicolons or command substitutions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/tts.shconstructs a JSON request body using string interpolation for the$VOICEand$FORMATvariables before passing the string tojq. This allows for JSON structure injection if these parameters are not strictly validated, although the impact is limited to the API request itself. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits user-supplied text prompts and optional image/video URLs to the external service
gen.pollinations.ai. This is consistent with the skill's stated purpose of providing AI generation capabilities. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is a surface for indirect prompt injection. Because it retrieves and displays content generated by an external AI service, the agent could potentially be influenced by instructions embedded in the API's responses if those responses are not treated as untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: API responses from
gen.pollinations.ai(captured inscripts/chat.shandscripts/tts.sh). - Boundary markers: None present in the scripts or documentation to distinguish service output from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution (
curl,jq,base64) and file system writes. - Sanitization: Prompts are URL-encoded in
scripts/image.shand handled viajq --argin other scripts, but the output returned to the agent is not sanitized.
Audit Metadata