security-reviewer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured with the
Bashtool and provided with extensive command-line examples for system auditing, network reconnaissance, and privilege escalation (e.g.,sudo -l,find / -perm -4000,nmap -sV -p- target.com). These capabilities allow the agent to perform invasive operations on the host environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to harvest credentials and sensitive information from system locations. Specifically,
penetration-testing.mdguides the agent to usegrepto find passwords in~/.bash_historyand across all user directories in/home/*/, which constitutes high-severity exposure of local user data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation (
sast-tools.md,secret-scanning.md) directs the agent to install numerous third-party security utilities using package managers likenpm,pip,go install, andbrew. For example, it fetches thegosectool from GitHub and various security linters from public registries. While these sources are well-known, executing automated software installations on a host introduces significant supply chain risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection because its core workflow involves reading and analyzing untrusted codebases, configuration files, and logs.
- Ingestion points: Files read during SAST scans, code audits, and infrastructure reviews (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill lacks delimiters or instructions to treat external data as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: Full access to the
Bash,Read,Grep, andGlobtools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of file content is performed before the agent processes it or acts upon instructions found within.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata