skills/sundial-org/skills/codex/Gen Agent Trust Hub

codex

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill provides access to the --yolo flag. As documented in SKILL.md and references/exec-reference.md, this mode offers 'No restrictions', 'No sandbox', and 'Full system access'. In non-interactive mode, this allows an LLM to execute arbitrary commands and modify files on the host system without any human-in-the-loop verification.
  • CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (MEDIUM): The documentation in SKILL.md and references/exec-reference.md encourages the use of CODEX_API_KEY=sk-... to authenticate. While this is a standard CLI pattern, in the context of an AI agent, it increases the risk of the key being logged, exposed in process trees, or leaked if the environment is captured.
  • DATA_EXPOSURE (LOW): The tool is designed to read from any file path provided in a prompt (e.g., ~/.codex/config.toml, ~/.aws/credentials). When combined with the --yolo or --full-auto flags, it has the capability to read and potentially exfiltrate sensitive configuration files.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is intended to process external codebases and PR diffs. It lacks explicit boundary markers or sanitization instructions for the data it ingests, making it a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious comments in a codebase could influence the agent's execution of codex exec commands.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:38 PM