oh-my-codex
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill implements a
--madmaxflag which explicitly enables the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxsetting in the underlying CLI. This is a direct attempt to override safety constraints and security boundaries. - [Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution] (MEDIUM): The installation process requires global installation of a package from an untrusted source (
npm install -g oh-my-codex). Since the author and repository are not within the trusted scope, this poses a risk of supply chain attack or execution of malicious scripts during installation. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill automatically injects instructions from
<cwd>/AGENTS.mdinto the model's system prompt. - Ingestion points:
<cwd>/AGENTS.mdfile loaded via the-c model_instructions_fileargument. - Boundary markers: None identified; instructions are injected directly as a configuration file.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write, andReadtools, providing a high-impact surface if instructions are compromised. - Sanitization: None; the skill assumes the local project file is safe to use as a system-level instruction override.
- [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill supports lifecycle hooks by executing JavaScript files located in
.omx/hooks/*.mjs. This allows for arbitrary code execution within the user's environment whenever session events occur.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata