asc-cli

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the user to install the asc CLI tool via Homebrew from the author's tap (tddworks/tap/asccli). This involves downloading and installing external executable code onto the system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides examples for authenticating the CLI tool using sensitive API credentials and private key files (e.g., ~/.asc/AuthKey_XXXXXX.p8). While these are necessary for the tool's operation, they represent access to highly sensitive security assets.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality is achieved by executing the asc command-line utility with various arguments to manage App Store resources.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions define an 'affordances' mechanism where the agent is encouraged to execute commands provided directly in the tool's JSON output. This creates a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection, as data retrieved from external App Store Connect APIs could theoretically contain malicious command strings that the agent would then execute.
  • Ingestion points: JSON responses from asc CLI commands (e.g., asc apps list) containing an affordances field.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is explicitly told to 'Always use these instead of constructing commands manually'.
  • Capability inventory: The asc tool can perform a wide range of actions including listing/creating versions, uploading builds, and managing TestFlight users.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or verification performed on the commands retrieved from the tool's output before they are executed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 16, 2026, 09:53 AM