asc-users
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions specify the use of a sensitive local file path
~/.asc/AuthKey.p8which contains an App Store Connect API private key used for authentication. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of administrative commands using the
ascCLI tool, including destructive actions like removing team members and modifying user roles. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by processing external data from App Store Connect which then influences high-privilege operations.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from
asc users listandasc user-invitations listas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit markers or safety instructions to separate untrusted data from agent commands, making it possible for malicious content in user profiles to influence agent logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to remove users and modify roles via
asccommands inSKILL.mdandreferences/commands.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content returned by the external CLI tool before it is used in logic-gated shell operations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata