reviewing-code

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands (e.g., gh pr view PR_NUMBER, git diff BASE_BRANCH) using variables derived from user-provided input or extracted from URLs. Without strict validation or sanitization of these variables (e.g., ensuring PR_NUMBER is an integer), the skill is vulnerable to command injection attacks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted content from pull request descriptions, commit messages, and project-level configuration files (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md). This constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through gh pr view, gh pr diff, git diff, and by reading project files with cat.
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the ingested data as non-instructional content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses bash to execute git, gh, and custom CLI tools like gemini and codex, and has permissions to read and write to the filesystem (e.g., using /tmp/ files).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or content filtering is present in the instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 26, 2026, 09:11 PM