crypt-librarian
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill workflows (e.g.,
archive-manager,taste-analyzer) frequently invoke local Python and Shell scripts such ascrypt_db.py,generate_taste_seeds.py, andexa_research.py. These scripts are located in local directories outside the skill folder, meaning their integrity cannot be verified within this audit. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it ingests and processes data from external, untrusted web sources.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/flexible_discovery.pyfetches data from the Reddit API;scripts/exa_film_search.pyandworkflows/film-researcher.mdfetch content from the Exa API and various websites viafirecrawl. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers (e.g., XML tags) or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are used when passing external content to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
BashandEdittools, creating a risk that a successful injection could lead to unauthorized file modification or command execution. - Sanitization: The scripts do not perform sanitization of natural language content to filter for embedded instructions before return.
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill communicates with non-whitelisted domains (
api.exa.aiandreddit.com) to retrieve film metadata and search results. While necessary for the skill's discovery features, these represent external data dependencies.
Audit Metadata