crypt-librarian

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill workflows (e.g., archive-manager, taste-analyzer) frequently invoke local Python and Shell scripts such as crypt_db.py, generate_taste_seeds.py, and exa_research.py. These scripts are located in local directories outside the skill folder, meaning their integrity cannot be verified within this audit.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it ingests and processes data from external, untrusted web sources.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/flexible_discovery.py fetches data from the Reddit API; scripts/exa_film_search.py and workflows/film-researcher.md fetch content from the Exa API and various websites via firecrawl.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers (e.g., XML tags) or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are used when passing external content to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash and Edit tools, creating a risk that a successful injection could lead to unauthorized file modification or command execution.
  • Sanitization: The scripts do not perform sanitization of natural language content to filter for embedded instructions before return.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill communicates with non-whitelisted domains (api.exa.ai and reddit.com) to retrieve film metadata and search results. While necessary for the skill's discovery features, these represent external data dependencies.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 21, 2026, 05:49 PM