skill-optimizer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
run_eval.pyscript usessubprocess.Popento programmatically execute theclaudeCLI tool to test skill triggers. While it uses a list for arguments to mitigate shell injection, it executes system-level commands using inputs derived from local configuration files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scrape_documentation_helper.pyandreferences/documentation-scraping.mdfiles explicitly guide users to clone and executeSkill_Seekersfrom a third-party GitHub repository (yusufkaraaslan/Skill_Seekers) that is not a verified vendor. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
eval-viewer/viewer.htmlfile loads a production build of the SheetJS library from a remote CDN (cdn.sheetjs.com) for spreadsheet rendering. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via the
evals.jsoninput. - Ingestion points:
run_eval.pyreads test queries fromevals/evals.json(or any user-provided path). - Boundary markers: None. The queries are passed directly to the CLI command.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution of the
claudeCLI and automated LLM-based description improvement using the Anthropic API. - Sanitization: None. Queries from the JSON file are interpolated directly into the command line execution and LLM prompts.
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