skill-creator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a high-risk capability tier by combining untrusted data ingestion with write and execute permissions.
  • Ingestion points: The <description> argument in SKILL.md is the primary entry point for untrusted instructions.
  • Boundary markers: There are no technical delimiters or sanitization logic to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the description to write malicious code.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Write tool to create files and the Bash tool to modify permissions and execute commands.
  • Sanitization: No input validation or code-generation safety checks are implemented; the skill relies on the agent's reasoning.
  • Privilege Escalation (MEDIUM): In SKILL.md step 5, the agent is explicitly instructed to grant execution permissions (chmod +x) to dynamically generated scripts. This bypasses standard security boundaries for newly created files.
  • Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The skill generates arbitrary shell, Python, or Node.js code at runtime based on natural language input. This 'code-as-data' pattern is dangerous when the input source is untrusted.
  • Persistence (HIGH): The skill installs new executable artifacts into ~/.claude/skills/ or .claude/skills/. This ensures that any malicious functionality created via prompt injection remains active and available in all future agent sessions.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 14, 2026, 11:54 AM