mcp-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The file
scripts/connections.pycontains theMCPConnectionStdioclass which wrapsmcp.client.stdio.stdio_client. This class is designed to spawn subprocesses using a user-providedcommandandargs. This represents a high-risk capability if the agent is directed to use this connection factory with malicious input.\n- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): InSKILL.md(Phase 3.2), the instructions tell the agent to runnpx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector, which downloads and executes code from the npm registry. Additionally, the skill's workflow relies on fetching implementation instructions from external websites and then executing local code, a pattern that significantly increases the risk of remote code execution.\n- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill references and encourages the use of content frommodelcontextprotocol.ioandraw.githubusercontent.com. While these are documentation sources, they are not on the explicitly trusted organization list and provide the primary instructions for the agent's code generation tasks.\n- INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it lacks security boundaries for external data.\n - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to fetch protocol specifications and READMEs viaWebFetch.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety warnings are provided to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the fetched documentation.\n
- Capability inventory:
scripts/connections.pyprovides full subprocess execution via thestdiotransport.\n - Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the command strings or arguments before they are passed to the system shell.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata