part3-wrap

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to access and analyze sensitive session history files stored in ~/.claude/projects/. These logs encompass the full history of interactions with the agent, which often contains private source code, internal configuration details, and potentially exposed credentials or tokens from previous sessions.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In Block 1, the skill directs the agent to dynamically generate a new executable skill file (.claude/skills/my-session-wrap/SKILL.md) and subsequently execute it. Runtime script generation and execution bypass static analysis and allow for the introduction of arbitrary commands.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes session history logs, which are treated as untrusted data that could contain malicious instructions from previous contexts (Indirect Prompt Injection).
  • Ingestion points: Session log files located in the ~/.claude/projects/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to disregard commands embedded within the historic logs.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands, read/write files, and install packages.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or sanitizing the data extracted from the session history before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation explicitly encourages the user to have the agent install the jq system package if it is not already present, demonstrating the ability to modify the host system's environment.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 17, 2026, 06:06 AM