council
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute shell commands for retrieving content fromgit,gh(GitHub CLI), and platform-specific utilities likehoyeon-cliandcodex. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically spawns multiple sub-agents using the
Agenttool. These calls explicitly include the parametermode="bypassPermissions", which attempts to override or circumvent standard permission constraints for the sub-agents within the platform environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from local files, git diffs, and GitHub PRs and interpolates that content directly into the system prompts of sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Phase 1 collects data using
Read(),gh pr diff, andgit diffinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; while markdown headers are used, there are no explicit XML tags or 'ignore nested instructions' markers around the interpolated
[full topic content]variable. - Capability inventory: Sub-agents (panelists and judges) have access to
SendMessage,Bash,Read, and other sensitive tools, which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external content was detected before it is passed to the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata