execute
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's sandbox detection and TDD logic perform runtime installations of third-party packages. Specifically,
references/sandbox-detection.mdsuggests and executesnpm i -g chromuxandnpm i -g playwright, which are global installations of code from external registries.references/tdd-guide.mdalso performsnpm install -D vitestandpip install pytest. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator executes shell commands derived directly from the
spec.jsonand verification recipes. Files such asreferences/verify-recipes/cli.mdandreferences/verify-recipes/server.mdexecute commands based on input that may be influenced by external project data or sub-agent outputs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a 'self-read' pattern for worker agents, where instructions are dynamically built and passed to sub-agents. It is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests data from untrusted sources without sanitization.
- Ingestion points:
spec.json,.hoyeon/specs/{name}/context/learnings.json,.hoyeon/specs/{name}/context/issues.json, andround-summaries.json. - Boundary markers: None identified; data is interpolated directly into worker descriptions and prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including
Bash(shell execution),Write/Edit(file modification), and network access viacurlin several recipes. - Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the 'learnings' or 'issues' collected from previous workers before they are provided as context to new workers.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: In
references/verify-ralph.md, the skill explicitly instructs the agent to usesedto modify a protected file because the platform'sEdittool is blocked by a security guard (ralph-dod-guard). This represents a deliberate bypass of environmental security constraints.
Audit Metadata