team-assemble
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Subagents are explicitly configured with
mode: "bypassPermissions"as seen inSKILL.mdPhase 4 andreferences/agents.md. This allows these agents to use tools likeBashto execute arbitrary commands on the host system without requesting user approval for each action. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8). 1. Ingestion points: Phase 2 "scouts" read files such as CLAUDE.md, README.md, and source code via
GlobandReadtools inreferences/prompt-templates.md. 2. Boundary markers: The prompt templates inreferences/prompt-templates.mddo not use robust delimiters or instructions to prevent agents from following commands embedded in the files they read. 3. Capability inventory: The skill possessesBash,Write,Edit,TeamCreate, andTaskUpdatecapabilities, and subagents often run inbypassPermissionsmode. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the codebase content is performed before it is injected into subagent prompts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
references/enable-agent-teams.mdfile encourages users to install external software such astmuxvia package managers orit2via a GitHub repository (https://github.com/mkusaka/it2) to enable specific display modes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup instructions in
references/enable-agent-teams.mdguide users to modify sensitive shell configuration files such as~/.bashrcor~/.zshrcand the globalsettings.jsonfile to enable experimental features that grant broader tool execution permissions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata