team-assemble
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
mode: "bypassPermissions"flag when calling theTasktool inSKILL.md. This bypasses standard security gates and permission prompts for sub-agents, granting them elevated autonomy which can be exploited if they receive malicious instructions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection through its agent-to-agent data flow.
- Ingestion points: Results from earlier tasks (e.g.,
{result_1}inSKILL.mdand{architect_result}inreferences/prompt-templates.md) are directly interpolated into the prompts for subsequent agents. - Boundary markers: The templates do not use any delimiters (like triple quotes or XML tags) or safety instructions to distinguish between the system's instructions and the untrusted data being processed.
- Capability inventory: Sub-agents have the ability to execute code, modify files, and update task statuses via the
TaskandTaskUpdatetools, often under thebypassPermissionsflag. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content produced by one agent before it is used to direct the behavior of the next agent.
Audit Metadata