capture-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the user or agent to install a binary from
github.com/techulus/capture-go. While this is a standard installation method, the repository owner is not in the trusted source list, making the binary unverifiable. - PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): Indirect Prompt Injection risk through the
capture contentcommand. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the
capture content <url>andcapture metadata <url>commands as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded in the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute the
captureCLI which has the capability to write files to the local filesystem (-oflag) and perform network requests to any URL. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the fetched content is specified before it is processed by the agent.
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill relies on executing the
captureCLI. While this is the intended functionality, it grants the agent the ability to specify arbitrary output paths for files, which could lead to accidental or malicious file overwrites if the agent is manipulated.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata