setup-cloudbase-openclaw
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill uses a Node.js wrapper (
setup-cloudbase-openclaw.js) to execute internal scripts viaspawnSync. It also references a shell scriptscripts/detect-setup.shin the README. These scripts are intended to modify system-level configurations (e.g.,~/.openclaw/openclaw.json,mcporter.json). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill encourages the installation of packages and plugins from the
@cloudbasenpm scope and thetencentcloudbase/skillsGitHub repository. While likely legitimate for Tencent Cloud users, this organization is not on the 'Trusted GitHub Organizations' whitelist, requiring manual verification of the downloaded content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The 'Skill Enhancer' plugin (
plugins/skill-enhancer/index.ts) programmatically injects instructions into the AI agent's prompt during thebefore_agent_startevent. It uses authoritative language ('You MUST', 'NEVER skip') to override the model's default reasoning and force specific skill usage patterns. - [DATA_EXPOSURE] (SAFE): The skill provides templates for storing cloud provider credentials (
TENCENTCLOUD_SECRETID,TENCENTCLOUD_SECRETKEY) in local JSON configuration files. While this is standard for MCP setups, users should be aware that these secrets are stored in plaintext on the filesystem. - [UNVERIFIABLE_CODE] (MEDIUM): Key logic files referenced in
package.jsonandREADME.md, specificallyscripts/setup.mjs,scripts/detect-setup.sh, andscripts/test-env.mjs, are missing from the provided source code. This prevents a full security audit of the file system modifications and network operations performed during the setup process.
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