baoyu-image-gen
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
execSyncto runcurlfor API communication inscripts/providers/google.tswhen a proxy is configured. The command string is constructed using interpolation of environment variables such ashttps_proxy, which could allow for command injection if these variables are controlled by an attacker.\n - Evidence:
execSync(curl -s --connect-timeout 30 --max-time 300 ${proxyArgs} "${url}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "x-goog-api-key: ${apiKey}" -d @-, ...)inscripts/providers/google.ts.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes legitimate network requests to official endpoints for Google Gemini, OpenAI, Alibaba DashScope, and Replicate to generate and retrieve images.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local files provided via command-line arguments and sends their content to external AI provider endpoints.\n - Evidence:
readFileis used inmain.tsand provider scripts to ingest prompt files and reference images for transmission to remote APIs.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from local files and processes it through LLMs and system commands.\n - Ingestion points:
scripts/main.tsvia--promptfilesand--refflags.\n - Boundary markers: Absent.\n
- Capability inventory: File reading/writing, network operations, and subprocess execution (
execSync).\n - Sanitization: Absent.
Audit Metadata