clean-component-removal

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to perform destructive operations, including the removal of files via rm -f and the termination of processes using pkill -f. It also invokes a local shell script located at ~/eon/cc-skills/plugins/tts-tg-sync/scripts/kokoro-install.sh to perform uninstallation tasks.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions explicitly target a secrets file at ~/.claude/.secrets/ccterrybot-telegram for deletion. Accessing or managing files within credential directories is a sensitive operation that carries risk if misused.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a 'Post-Execution Reflection' mechanism that commands the agent to autonomously edit the SKILL.md file. This self-modification capability can be used to alter agent behavior or bypass security logic across subsequent sessions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface through the AskUserQuestion tool, where untrusted user input is collected to influence component removal logic.
  • Ingestion points: User selection input via AskUserQuestion in Phase 1 of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the instructions do not specify delimiters for user-provided data.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via Bash (including rm, pkill, and local script execution).
  • Sanitization: None identified; the workflow lacks explicit validation or escaping of the user's choice before execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 4, 2026, 09:52 AM