skills/terrylica/cc-skills/contribute/Gen Agent Trust Hub

contribute

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill accepts a feature branch name from user input and interpolates it directly into a bash command string ('git town hack {branch-name}'). This allows for arbitrary command injection if the user provides a branch name containing shell metacharacters such as semicolons, backticks, or pipe symbols.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Post-Execution Reflection' section instructs the agent to self-modify its own 'SKILL.md' file based on the outcome of its execution. This architectural pattern is vulnerable to persistent indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: user-provided feature names and command outputs. Boundary markers: none. Capability inventory: 'Write', 'Edit', 'Glob', and 'Bash' tools. Sanitization: no validation or filtering of content before writing it back to the skill's instructions.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The workflow involves running 'git remote get-url' and 'git config', which are commands that frequently return sensitive data such as repository access tokens or private server configurations, exposing these secrets to the agent's execution context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 4, 2026, 09:52 AM