doppler-workflows

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Bash tool to execute administrative commands, including doppler run --command patterns which evaluate shell strings containing injected environment variables.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The AWS_WORKFLOW.md file includes instructions for destructive operations, specifically aws iam delete-access-key, which can lead to service disruption if executed improperly.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The SKILL.md file contains patterns for reading sensitive files from the local filesystem, specifically ~/.claude/.secrets/gh-token-accountname, which constitutes data exposure of credentials.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Employs mise [env] configuration that uses cache(run='...') to dynamically execute shell commands (e.g., doppler secrets get) to populate environment variables at runtime.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: References the installation of the Doppler CLI via Homebrew (brew install dopplerhq/cli/doppler). This targets a well-known service and is documented neutrally.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it ingests untrusted data from Doppler secrets and the filesystem without explicit sanitization before interpolating them into shell commands.
  • Ingestion points: Doppler secrets values/notes, .mise.toml, and files in ~/.claude/.secrets/.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; commands are executed directly in the shell context.
  • Capability inventory: High-privilege actions including aws iam delete-access-key, doppler secrets set, and arbitrary Bash execution.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of validation or escaping for external content before execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 6, 2026, 11:48 PM