fork-intelligence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains self-modification instructions that direct the agent to rewrite its own source code.
- Evidence: The 'Self-Evolving Skill' section in
SKILL.mdstates: 'If instructions are wrong... fix this file immediately, don't defer.' and the 'Post-Execution Reflection' section reinforces this: 'Find this SKILL.md's canonical path before editing... Log it. Do NOT defer. The next invocation inherits whatever you leave behind.' - Risk: This instruction creates a persistence mechanism where the agent's behavior can be permanently altered based on runtime execution results.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
gh apiinSKILL.md(Steps 5 and 7) to fetch commit messages and pull request titles/bodies from third-party GitHub forks. - Boundary markers: Absent. The data is processed directly via shell pipes to
jqand then into the agent's context. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash,Grep, andGlobtools, and has instructions to write to the file system (Self-Evolving mechanism). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of escaping or filtering of the fetched GitHub metadata.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill systematically collects Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from commit history.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 5 usesgh apiwith the query.commits[] | {..., author: .commit.author.email}to extract contributor email addresses for 'Institutional contributor' analysis. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains numerous complex shell command snippets for execution.
- Evidence: Steps 1 through 7 in
SKILL.mdprovide bash commands usinggh apiandjqfor repository interrogation and data processing.
Audit Metadata