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Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill interacts with sensitive Telegram session files located at
~/.local/share/telethon/<profile>.session. These files contain authentication tokens that provide full access to a user's Telegram account. While required for the skill's functionality, this represents exposure of high-value credentials. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes 'Self-Evolving Skill' and 'Post-Execution Reflection' instructions that direct the AI to autonomously rewrite the
SKILL.mdfile to 'fix' instructions or 'improvise' workarounds. This creates a feedback loop vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, as the agent may modify its own system-level instructions based on untrusted data or execution outcomes. - Ingestion points: Results from reading or forwarding messages and script execution logs.
- Boundary markers: None present to distinguish instructions from data.
- Capability inventory: Ability to modify local instruction files and execute shell commands.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content used to update the skill instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the vendor's
tg-cli.pyscript usinguv runwithin a Bash environment. The script path is dynamically constructed using theCLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOTenvironment variable.
Audit Metadata