skills/terrylica/cc-skills/notion-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

notion-cli

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes 'Self-Evolving' instructions in SKILL.md that command the agent to 'Fix this file immediately if instructions drift'. This directive for the agent to modify its own core instructions based on runtime experience is a pattern that can be exploited to persistently alter the agent's behavior.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends installing a third-party Go binary (notion) from an unverified repository (4ier/notion-cli) using Homebrew. Running binaries from unvetted sources introduces supply chain risk.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions identify sensitive local file paths like ~/.config/notion/credentials.json and provide commands to fetch tokens from the Doppler secret manager. This highlights high-value targets for potential credential access.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes data from external Notion databases and pages.
  • Ingestion points: Content retrieved via notion search, notion page view, and notion db query in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are provided to treat Notion content as untrusted data or to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to the Bash tool, which allows for arbitrary command execution.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from the Notion API.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 4, 2026, 09:51 AM