session-debrief

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read session history files located in ~/.claude/projects/, which contain sensitive logs of user interactions, source code, and tool outputs. This information is transmitted to an external service (MiniMax API) for processing.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly accesses a secret file at ~/.claude/.secrets/ccterrybot-telegram to retrieve the MINIMAX_API_KEY for authentication, exposing local credential storage practices.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Agent tool to execute shell commands via bun to run a local TypeScript script (session-debrief.ts) with arguments derived from user input.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface:
  • Ingestion points: Session histories are read from ~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when processing logs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Agent tool for shell execution and Bash for command running.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested session data is mentioned before it is processed or used in prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains self-modifying instructions under the 'Self-Evolving Skill' header, directing the agent to immediately edit the SKILL.md file to update its own instructions or practices based on runtime results.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 4, 2026, 09:51 AM