mcp-tools

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes the execute_terminal_command tool, which allows the agent to run arbitrary shell commands within the IDE terminal. This provides a direct path for executing potentially malicious commands on the host machine.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides instructions to access the claude_desktop_config.json file in a user-specific path (C:\Users\Chris\AppData\Roaming\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json). This file contains sensitive application configurations. Furthermore, tools like get_all_open_file_texts and search_in_files_content allow the extraction of sensitive information or source code from the project environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection:
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads untrusted data from local project files (get_file_text_by_path, get_open_in_editor_file_text) and terminal output (get_terminal_text).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat external data as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within that data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes high-impact capabilities such as terminal command execution (execute_terminal_command), file modification (replace_file_text_by_path), and IDE action execution (execute_action_by_id).
  • Sanitization: The skill logic contains no evidence of sanitization or validation for content ingested from external sources before it is processed or used in subsequent operations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 03:40 AM