cardano-cli-staking-operator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The skill directly accesses and utilizes highly sensitive private key files (payment.skey, stake.skey). While necessary for the stated purpose of a staking operator, providing an AI agent access to raw private keys on disk creates a significant exposure risk where keys could be leaked through tool logs or hijacked by other skills.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill uses broad wildcard permissions Bash(cardano-cli:*). This allows the agent to execute any command within the Cardano CLI suite, which may exceed the minimum necessary permissions required for staking, potentially allowing broader wallet or node manipulation.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): This skill exhibits a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads external data from stake.addr via cat and accepts user/external inputs for <utxo>#<index>, <payment-addr>, and <pool-id-bech32>.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or delimiters used to separate these untrusted inputs from the command logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to submit transactions to the blockchain via cardano-cli conway transaction submit.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input strings is performed before they are interpolated into shell commands. A malicious input could potentially alter the transaction parameters (e.g., change the destination address or reward amount) before signing.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 09:18 PM