mcp-management

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill is designed to spawn local subprocesses as MCP servers using the StdioClientTransport from the @modelcontextprotocol/sdk. The commands and arguments are loaded from a JSON configuration file (.claude/.mcp.json), which allows for arbitrary command execution on the host machine if the file is modified or contains malicious entries.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill facilitates Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) by design.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the system via MCP tool results, resources, and prompts retrieved from external servers (e.g., brave-search or puppeteer).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the script logic; untrusted external data is passed directly into the agent context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-impact capabilities including command execution (child_process.spawn via SDK) and local file writing (writeFileSync in cli.ts).
  • Sanitization: No mechanisms are present to sanitize, escape, or validate content returned by MCP tools before it is processed by the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on several external Node.js dependencies and encourages the installation of third-party MCP servers via npx. Although the core SDK is a known package, the use of npx to execute unverified remote code at runtime is a notable risk. The recommendation to use gemini-cli (from a trusted source) is recognized under [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE] but does not mitigate the skill's own operational risks.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 05:09 AM