generate-blueprints
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Category 8: Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill has a significant attack surface because it is instructed to 'Deeply research all systems' and 'Read existing documentation' at 'all levels'. This is a classic Indirect Prompt Injection vector.
- Ingestion points: Phase 1 and Phase 2 explicitly instruct the agent to read top-level directories, README.md files at all levels, inline documentation, and test files (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the files being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
write_blueprinttool to write files to the repository root and updates an index at.claude/rules/hashi-blueprints/blueprints-index.md. Writing to the.claude/rules/directory is particularly sensitive as it modifies the agent's operating instructions. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is mentioned. Malicious instructions placed in a code comment or README could be summarized and persisted into the blueprint index, which the agent may then follow in subsequent sessions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata