xlsx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform operations with elevated privileges using
sudoto install system dependencies (sudo apt-get install python3-pip libreoffice gnumeric). Execution ofsudocommands by an AI agent represents a high-risk privilege escalation vector. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs several Python packages (
openpyxl,pandas,xlrd,xlsxwriter) and system software (libreoffice,gnumeric) from official package registries and well-known repositories using package managers (pip,apt,brew). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from Excel and CSV files, making it susceptible to indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious content in a spreadsheet could attempt to manipulate agent logic.
- Ingestion points: External data is loaded into the agent's context from
.xlsx,.xls, and.csvfiles usingpandas.read_excel()andopenpyxl.load_workbook(). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or boundary instructions are defined to separate untrusted spreadsheet data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
bashtool for command execution and thewrite_filetool, which could be leveraged by successful injection payloads. - Sanitization: While the 'Security Notes' section suggests sanitizing formulas and validating paths, the provided code snippets do not contain actual sanitization or validation logic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata