skills/thevertexlab/pnote-skill/pnote/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pnote

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill requires the manual installation of the pnote npm package (npm install -g pnote). Additionally, the recommended installation method uses npx skills add thevertexlab/pnote-skill, which points to a GitHub repository outside of the trusted list. This introduces risk from unverified third-party code.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill uses allowed-tools: Bash(pnote *) to restrict the agent's execution environment to the specific pnote binary. This effectively limits the attack surface for command injection beyond the intended CLI functionality.
  • DATA_EXPOSURE (LOW): The skill facilitates the handling of sensitive data such as Personal Access Tokens (PATs) and PIN-protected notes. Users are instructed to authenticate manually via the CLI, but passing PINs via the -p flag or environment variables could result in sensitive data appearing in process lists or shell history if not handled carefully by the user.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW):
  • Ingestion points: The skill retrieves content from external sources via pnote notes get and pnote search, which pull user-controlled note content into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the retrieved notes.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can list, search, read, and create notes/snippets using the pnote tool.
  • Sanitization: None detected. Note content is ingested as raw text, which could influence subsequent agent behavior if notes contain adversarial prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:34 PM