feishu-bridge
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages system-level persistence and script execution to maintain the bridge service.\n
- Utilizes
launchctlto load a macOSLaunchAgentfor persistent background operation.\n - Executes local scripts
bridge.mjsandsetup-service.mjsto configure and run the bridge.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and manages sensitive credential files within the user's home directory.\n - Reads and writes to
~/.thinkfleet/secrets/feishu_app_secretand~/.thinkfleet/thinkfleet.json.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a conduit for untrusted data, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Ingests user messages from the Feishu platform via the
im.message.receive_v1event (file: SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify any delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in user messages.\n
- Capability inventory: Messages are forwarded to an AI agent through the ThinkFleet Gateway, which may have tool-execution capabilities.\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external message content is described.
Audit Metadata