fork-terminal
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The tool
fork_terminal.pyis designed to execute arbitrary shell commands provided by the agent. Files likecookbook/cli-command.mdencourage using this for any arbitrary command, creating a significant security risk if the agent is manipulated. Additionally, the skill consistently promotes the use of flags like--dangerously-skip-permissionsand--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxwhich are designed to bypass standard safety confirmations and sandboxing, effectively granting the spawned agents full autonomous control over the host system.- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill depends on multiple external Python scripts (spawn_session.py,tournament.py,tournament_review.py) that are not included in the provided file list. These are executed viapython3using the${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}environment variable, making their logic unverifiable and potentially dangerous.- PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): Task templates inprompts/tournament_task.mdandprompts/worktree_task.mdinterpolate user-provided${TASK_DESCRIPTION}directly into instructions for spawned agents. This lacks sanitization or boundary markers, allowing potential indirect prompt injection attacks where a user-provided task could hijack the sub-agent's behavior. Evidence Chain: 1. Ingestion points:TASK.mdcreated from templates. 2. Boundary markers: None used. 3. Capability inventory: Full shell access viafork_terminal.pyand referenced scripts. 4. Sanitization: None observed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata