skills/tiann/execplan-skill/execplan/Gen Agent Trust Hub

execplan

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 12, 2026

Risk Level: LOWNO_CODE
Full Analysis

The skill consists of a README, a SKILL.md definition, and a detailed methodology document (PLANS.md). The primary function of this skill is to instruct an AI agent on how to structure and execute complex tasks using a predefined 'ExecPlan' methodology.

  1. Prompt Injection: No malicious prompt injection patterns (e.g., 'IMPORTANT: Ignore', 'You are now unrestricted') were found. While the documents contain strong directives like 'follow PLANS.md to the letter' and 'NON-NEGOTIABLE REQUIREMENTS', these are consistently applied to enforce adherence to the defined task execution methodology, not to bypass the AI's safety or ethical guidelines. The instruction 'Do not prompt the user for "next steps"; simply proceed to the next milestone' aims for autonomy within the defined plan, not to circumvent user oversight maliciously.
  2. Data Exfiltration: No commands or patterns indicating data exfiltration (e.g., 'curl' with sensitive file paths, reading of credential files) were found across any of the files. The description of agent capabilities (e.g., 'list files, read files, search, run the project, and run tests') is benign as it describes general agent functionality and does not instruct the agent to access or exfiltrate sensitive data.
  3. Obfuscation: No obfuscation techniques (Base64, zero-width characters, homoglyphs, URL/hex/HTML encoding) were detected in any of the files.
  4. Unverifiable Dependencies: The 'PLANS.md' document explicitly discourages external dependencies for knowledge ('Do not point to external blogs or docs; if knowledge is required, embed it in the plan itself in your own words'), which is a positive security practice. The external links in 'README.md' are purely informational (e.g., OpenAI Cookbook, YouTube video, agentskills.io) and do not involve downloading or executing code.
  5. Privilege Escalation: No commands or patterns indicative of privilege escalation (e.g., 'sudo', 'chmod 777') were found.
  6. Persistence Mechanisms: No patterns for establishing persistence (e.g., modifying '.bashrc', creating cron jobs) were found.
  7. Metadata Poisoning: The 'name' and 'description' fields in 'SKILL.md' and 'README.md' are benign and accurately reflect the skill's purpose.
  8. Indirect Prompt Injection: The skill itself is a set of instructions for the AI. It does not contain any hidden malicious instructions that would constitute indirect prompt injection. The risk of indirect prompt injection would arise if the content the AI processes using this skill were malicious, but the skill's own files are clean.
  9. Time-Delayed / Conditional Attacks: No conditional logic or time-based triggers for malicious behavior were found.

Overall, the skill is well-documented and focuses on providing a structured approach for AI agents to manage complex tasks. It does not contain any executable code or scripts directly, but rather provides a methodology for the agent to follow. No security risks were identified.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
LOW
Analyzed
Feb 12, 2026, 06:24 AM