agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides an
evalcommand that allows for arbitrary JavaScript execution within the browser context. Documentation specifically encourages using Base64 encoding (-bflag) to bypass shell escaping, which can also be used to obfuscate the intent of executed scripts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool includes a
--allow-file-accessflag, which grants the browser permission to read local files viafile://URLs. If misconfigured or exploited, this could allow an attacker to read sensitive local documents. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
state saveandstate loadcommands enable exporting and importing full browser session data, including cookies and localStorage, to local files (e.g.,auth-state.json). While documentation warns against committing these files, they represent a significant risk for local credential exposure if not handled with strict permissions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to ingest and process data from arbitrary external websites, making it a target for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
agent-browser open,agent-browser snapshot, andagent-browser get textcommands. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided in the skill to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the web content it retrieves.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the filesystem (
state save,screenshot,pdf,record stop) and perform network operations via the browser. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or safety filtering for the data extracted from web pages.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions include the installation of the
agent-browserpackage from the global NPM registry and theappiumdriver for mobile automation.
Audit Metadata