agent-tools
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user/agent to install its CLI tool using a dangerous pattern: fetching a remote script and piping it directly to the shell.
- Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | shfound inSKILL.mdandreferences/authentication.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily utilizes the
infshCLI tool to perform various tasks including running arbitrary cloud-hosted AI applications, searching for apps, and managing authentication. - Evidence:
infsh app run,infsh login, and otherinfshsubcommands are the primary interface described in all files. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill explicitly includes functionality to read local files (images, audio, video) and upload them to the vendor's remote infrastructure for cloud processing.
- Evidence: Documentation in
references/running-apps.mdstates: 'The CLI automatically uploads local files when you provide a file path instead of a URL'. Example:infsh app run falai/topaz-image-upscaler --input '{"image": "/path/to/photo.jpg", "upscale_factor": 2}'. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes untrusted local data and user-supplied prompts through external AI models without apparent sanitization.
- Ingestion points: User prompts and local file contents (images, audio) provided via the
--inputflag inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; inputs are passed as raw JSON strings or files.
- Capability inventory: Execution of cloud-based LLMs, image/video generators, and social media automation (Twitter) via the
infshCLI. - Sanitization: Not documented; inputs are passed directly to the remote API.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata