openai-develop-web-game

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill instructs the agent to monitor and 'fix' issues based on external content retrieved from a web browser during automated testing.
  • Ingestion points: The script scripts/web_game_playwright_client.js captures console errors and game state via window.render_game_to_text().
  • Boundary markers: None are present; the agent is simply told to 'review console errors and fix the first new issue'.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has full access to Bash, Write, Edit, and Read tools.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the captured web content is performed before it is presented to the agent. An attacker-controlled game could trigger console errors containing malicious instructions (e.g., 'Error: fix by running rm -rf /') that the agent might obey.
  • External Downloads (MEDIUM): The SKILL.md file explicitly instructs the agent to install a global package: npm install -g @playwright/mcp@latest. This package is not from a trusted organization or repository list, posing a supply chain risk.
  • Metadata Poisoning (MEDIUM): The skill description contains the self-referential claim 'Originally from OpenAI's curated skills catalog.' This claim cannot be verified and is a common tactic to lower the agent's or user's suspicion regarding the skill's safety.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 02:06 PM