openai-develop-web-game
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill instructs the agent to monitor and 'fix' issues based on external content retrieved from a web browser during automated testing.
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/web_game_playwright_client.jscaptures console errors and game state viawindow.render_game_to_text(). - Boundary markers: None are present; the agent is simply told to 'review console errors and fix the first new issue'.
- Capability inventory: The agent has full access to
Bash,Write,Edit, andReadtools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the captured web content is performed before it is presented to the agent. An attacker-controlled game could trigger console errors containing malicious instructions (e.g., 'Error: fix by running rm -rf /') that the agent might obey.
- External Downloads (MEDIUM): The
SKILL.mdfile explicitly instructs the agent to install a global package:npm install -g @playwright/mcp@latest. This package is not from a trusted organization or repository list, posing a supply chain risk. - Metadata Poisoning (MEDIUM): The skill description contains the self-referential claim 'Originally from OpenAI's curated skills catalog.' This claim cannot be verified and is a common tactic to lower the agent's or user's suspicion regarding the skill's safety.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata