tasks
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation mandates the use of
@trigger.dev/sdkandzod. While established in the developer community, Trigger.dev is not on the pre-approved trusted source list, requiring verification of the package integrity. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (MEDIUM): (Category 8) The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data through task payloads, creating a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Payload parameters in
task,schemaTask, andtriggercalls withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions or delimiters provided to isolate untrusted payload content from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables background job execution, remote task triggering, and network requests via
retry.fetch, providing significant side-effect capabilities. - Sanitization: The documentation correctly recommends
zodfor schema validation, which helps prevent data-type confusion but does not inherently block natural language prompt injection within string fields. - [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill facilitates the execution of background tasks. While these are managed by the Trigger.dev platform, they involve running code defined in the task's
runfunction, which must be carefully audited by the user.
Audit Metadata