assemblyai-transcribe
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- DATA_EXFILTRATION (HIGH): The skill implements a workflow that reads local files and uploads them to
api.assemblyai.comfor transcription. This creates a significant exfiltration surface where an attacker could trick the agent into 'transcribing' sensitive configuration or credential files (e.g.,~/.ssh/id_rsa,.env) and sending them to the external API. - Ingestion points: Local file paths and remote URLs provided by the user or found in processed data (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from acting on content within the files it processes.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Exectool to runnode, which reads local file system content and performs network POST requests. - Sanitization: No validation is performed on the file type or path before it is passed to the transcription script.
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The installation instructions (README.md) direct users to download and install the skill from a non-whitelisted third-party GitHub repository (
tristanmanchester/agent-skills). - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The usage patterns involve passing complex JSON strings via the
--configflag to a shell command. This is highly susceptible to shell injection or breakage if the agent interpolates user-controlled data into the JSON string without rigorous escaping.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata