track17

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill is hosted and installed from an untrusted GitHub repository (tristanmanchester/agent-skills). Per the [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], this source is not within the defined trusted organizations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill frequently executes a local Python script (scripts/track17.py) to manage tracking data. While this is the intended functionality, it relies on the integrity of the unprovided script file.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Indirect Prompt Injection Surface (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through 17TRACK API responses (polling) and webhook payloads ingested via ingest-webhook or the webhook-server mode.
  • Boundary markers: There are no delimited boundaries or specific instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the tracking data (e.g., in labels, statuses, or carrier messages).
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute subprocesses (python3) and modify the local filesystem (SQLite DB and webhook inbox).
  • Sanitization: The provided documentation does not mention sanitization or validation of the external content before it is summarized for the user. An attacker who can influence tracking information (e.g., via a malicious tracking update or carrier message) could potentially inject instructions into the agent's summary and decision-making loop.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (LOW): The skill requires a TRACK17_TOKEN. While no secrets are hardcoded in the provided files, the instructions remind the agent not to echo these tokens, confirming their sensitive nature.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 05:36 AM