github-api-cache
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill ingests untrusted data from external GitHub project items and field definitions. An attacker with access to the target GitHub repository or project could embed malicious instructions in item titles, field names, or labels.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md (lines 53, 56) uses
gh project field-listandgh project item-listto populateGH_CACHE_FIELDSandGH_CACHE_ITEMS. - Boundary markers: Absent. The data is exported directly to environment variables used by other high-privilege skills.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses write capabilities via
gh project item-editanditem-add, and it feeds data toautonomous-orchestrationandissue-driven-developmentskills. - Sanitization: Uses
jqfor parsing, but does not sanitize the resulting strings before they are used in downstream decision-making or command construction. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): Several functions construct shell commands by interpolating variables extracted from the API cache.
- Evidence: In
get_cached_item_id(line 104) andset_status_cached(line 144), variables like$issue_numand$item_idare used within shell strings. If the cached JSON contains malicious payloads designed to break out ofjqselectors or shell quotes, it could lead to arbitrary command execution in the local environment.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata