obsidian-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes an
evalcommand which allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the Obsidian application context. This represents a critical risk if the agent is tricked into processing malicious code strings. (Evidence: references/command-reference.md)\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Theplugin:installandtheme:installcommands allow the installation of unverified community-contributed extensions. This enables the execution of remote, third-party code that could be malicious. (Evidence: references/command-reference.md)\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill enables the use of theobsidianCLI for destructive operations, including permanent file deletion (deletewithpermanentflag), overwriting files (history:restore), and triggering application restarts (restart). It also includes low-level access via Chrome DevTools Protocol (dev:cdp). (Evidence: SKILL.md, references/command-reference.md)\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of reading untrusted vault data.\n - Ingestion points: Notes are ingested via
read,search, anddaily:readcommands (SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore content within notes.\n
- Capability inventory: Includes file system modification, network navigation via
webcommand, and arbitrary code execution viaeval.\n - Sanitization: Absent. Note content is retrieved and provided to the agent without escaping or safety filtering.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata